한국어 추측 증거성의 행위주 인칭 제약

초록

This article explores the interaction between analogy and first-person agency in main clauses from an evidentiality perspective. In this context, evidentiality divides analogy into two distinct types: one being inference, which relies on external observation, and the other being presumption, which is rooted in internal introspection. This distinction sheds light on the limitations placed on the first-person agent in the process of understanding or recognizing. The paper introduces the notion of ‘Evidentiality Collision' (Plungian, 2001, 2010), a concept that deals with the discrepancies between a proposition's inherent evidentiality and the speaker's external evidentiality. The analysis is expected to provide a theoretical framework for comprehending the variations in how constraints on the first-person perspective are relaxed within these two types of analogical evidentiality, depending on different pragmatic contexts.

키워드