清末ㆍ民國時期 “關稅自主” 성격의 확장 ― 해관 행정권 문제를 중심으로 ―

초록

This paper analyzes the process and significance of the expansion of the meaning of the tariff autonomy slogan into a political movement for the “the loss and recovery of tariff autonomy” amid the political and economic changes at the end of the Qing Dynasty and the early years of the Republic of China. Previous studies have explained the movement for the recovery of tariff autonomy as centered on the realization of national tariffs and the abolition of the Foreign Customs Commissioner System. However, this paper confirms that the perception of the Inspector-General as an entity infringing on China’s customs sovereignty was a phenomenon limited to a specific period (1922-1928). Additionally, it shows that the issue of revenue management, which had not been raised during the late Qing and early Republican periods, became a prominent concern, thereby expanding the scope of tariff autonomy. It was revealed that the group leading this public opinion was the banking business of Shanghai. Furthermore, it was determined that their ultimate goal was to secure control over the operation of the customs revenue and use it as a financial resource to stabilize the market. The tariff autonomy at the end of the Qing Dynasty primarily focused on the issue of negotiated tariffs. While the Qing government concentrated on raising tariff rates to expand national finances, the business sector focused on realizing protectionist trade policies through the implementation of national tariffs. The core issue was the tariff policy, and the identity of the customs administration was considered a secondary matter. Therefore, there was no reason to escalate this issue into a diplomatic problem that would negatively affect foreign negotiations. Although there was resistance to the foreign nature of the Inspector-General, this criticism was limited to objections about the inspector-general exceeding his original duties and expanding his influence, rather than a sovereignty-related issue. For this reason, the critique of the Foreign Customs Commissioner System and the countermeasures developed to weaken the powers of the Inspector-General and strengthen the Qing government’s control. However, changes occurred following the Xinhai Revolution(辛亥革命). The Qing government decided to transfer the customs revenues, which had been used as collateral for foreign loans and war indemnities, to foreign banks for management, which marked the beginning of the Inspector-General independently managing customs revenue. Despite this, even after the establishment of the Republic of China(中華民國), there was no significant change in the emphasis on negotiated tariffs in the concept of tariff autonomy. This is because the majority of the customs revenue during the late Qing and early Republic periods was spent on repaying internal and external debts and war indemnities, so the identity of the entity managing the revenue did not attract attention from a sovereignty perspective. However, with the emergence of surplus funds (關餘) in 1927, the management of customs revenue began to be reconsidered from a sovereignty standpoint. At the Washington Conference in 1921, it was decided to hold a meeting for the approval of China’s national tariffs, and in 1925, the Beijing Customs Special Conference(北京關稅特別會議) was confirmed, which further intensified the public opinion surrounding tariff autonomy. In this process, not only negotiated tariffs but also the Inspector-General’s administrative control over customs became an issue. The fact that the banking business of Shanghai led the movement for the recovery of tariff autonomy suggests that this phenomenon was not merely a sovereignty issue but was intertwined with the demands of interest groups. Furthermore, the study confirms that the banking business of Shanghai aimed to secure the control over the customs revenue deposited in the HSBC Inspector-General account and sought to use it as a financial resource to stabilize the financial market. From this perspective, the entity responsible for customs operations and tariff collection was not the key issue. In a time of financial instability, the immediate use of the customs revenue was more important than the specific identity of the operator. Therefore, the nationality of the Inspector-General, which had been criticized since the late Qing, did not become a contentious issue. On the contrary, under the context of warlord rule, the fact that the Inspector-General was a foreigner was a factor that could be advantageously utilized. As a result, a joint management body, including the Inspector-General, was planned to prevent the warlords from diverting customs revenue. The background to the critique of the foreign customs officers system within the tariff autonomy movement in the mid-1920s was rooted in the control of customs revenue. This demonstrates that the political slogan of “the loss and recovery of tariff autonomy” was not merely a sovereignty recovery movement but a complex process entangled with various political and economic interests.

키워드