통상협상, 왜 그렇게 더딘가?: 협상과정의 경제학

초록

This paper provides a theoretical work on the trade negotiations and enforcement of an agreement. Problems of trade negotiations between countries have a common strategic structure. Regardless of the concrete issues discussed, problems of the negotiation typically involve first a bargaining phase which selects a particular cooperative agenda and next an enforcement phase of a mutual agreement. That is, before nations enforce an international agreement, they must negotiate to decide which of many possible agreements to implement. To specify and explore this conception analytically we develop a game-theoretic model that depicts problems of trade negotiations as having two linked phases. Based on the model proposed here we can infer some interesting implications. For example, the more nations value future benefits, the greater the incentive to negotiate hard for a good agenda, possibly fostering costly standoffs that impede cooperation. Hopefully this work contributes to widen the theoretical research about the field of international negotiation.

키워드